Prior to Zhou’s ascension to the PSC, he had been a Politburo member and Minister of Public Security (2002–7); under his leadership, the number of provincial police chiefs and political-legal committee chairs involved in provincial party leadership across the country increased sharply. Zhou Yongkang’s son Zhou Bin and other family members were implicated in bribery; other senior figures in Zhou’s network who have been arrested or investigated include Li Chuncheng, former deputy party secretary of Sichuan; Other prominent officials within the public security apparatus who have been purged since 2012 include former Vice Minister of Public Security Li Dongsheng (李东生) and Vice Minister of Public Security and head of Interpol Meng Hongwei (孟宏伟). The CCDI is led by Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member Zhao Leiji (赵乐际), who succeeded Wang Qishan in fall 2017, whereas CCDI deputy Yang Xiaodu (杨晓渡) leads the NSC. A number of articles in Chinese public administration journals speak positively of the potential for grid management to advance urban governance (and, in some cases, the articles explicitly acknowledge the potential of grid management to deepen party penetration into society at the grassroots level). [lii] Andrew Browne, “China uses ‘Digital Leninism’ to manage economy and monitor citizens,” Wall Street Journal, 17 October 2017, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-leads-china-into-big-data-dictatorship-1508237820, [liii] Wu Qiang, “Urban grid management and police state in China,” China Change, 12 August 2014, at https://chinachange.org/2013/08/08/the-urban-grid-management-and-police-state-in-china-a-brief-overview/, [liv] Lin Xuefei, “Zhengfujian zuzhi xuexi yu zhengce zaishengchan” [Organizational learning among governments and policy reproduction], Gonggong guanli xuebao (Journal of Public Management), Vol. The Central National Security Commission reports to the party leadership and holds a higher rank than the regular leading small groups. Sheena Greitens is an assistant professor in the political science department at the University of Missouri and co-director of the university's Institute for Korean Studies. In June 2014, he was expelled from the CCP and transferred to the judicial authorities on charges of bribery; in January 2016, he was sentenced to sixteen years in prison for bribery totaling ~22 million RMB (~3.5 million USD). [x] Combined with the high degree of personnel replacement within the coercive apparatus (see below), these changes can be seen both as an attempt to solve a long-standing bureaucratic coordination problem in China’s party-state system, and as an attempt to consolidate Xi’s personal control over the coercive apparatus, an area key to his political survival and power. Accessed 4 April 2019. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, there have been major structural, legal, personnel, and policy changes to the CCP’s approach to domestic security. 222 (June 2015): 339–539. In early 2017, XUAR authorities initiated an “Accurate Census and Population Verification Program” (全疆人口精准核查) with an emphasis on southern Xinjiang (where the Uighur population is concentrated); the program is intended to collect both biographical  and biological information on Uighur residents that may be used to determine the political reliability of individuals[lxxxi] Local authorities have also started to construct an “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP, yitihua lianhe zuozhan pinghe, 一体化联合作战平台), which employs facial recognition and machine learning to analyze graphical information collected from an expansive surveillance network. The IJOP collects data from video cameras, security checkpoints, and other official records, uses predictive algorithms to analyze it, and then provides the information to local officials so they can respond rapidly. Indeed, thus far the highest-ranking party official to face corruption charges came from within the non-military coercive apparatus: Zhou Yongkang (周永康), former member of the PSC and secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (zhengfawei, 政法委) from 2007 to 2012. Associate Professor of Public Affairs Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs University of Texas at Austin. Meng’s Interpol position had been seen as a mark of China’s growing leadership in international institutions, but it had also raised concern that Interpol would be used to crack down on dissidents and Xi’s political opponents abroad. [lxxiv], Early 2017 marked a further intensification and broadening of the CCP’s coercive efforts in the form of wide-scale extrajudicial detentions and internments aimed at mass indoctrination and re-education. There was some belief that in the past this fragmentation had prevented Chinese leaders from receiving the information needed to make decisions in a timely, proactive manner. Press: comms@cnas.org. [v] One of the primary drivers for creating the CNSC was to improve intelligence-sharing and policy coordination by reducing bureaucratic stove-piping and fragmentation across previously atomized military, intelligence, and public security organizations. [lxxviii] This narrative has been assisted by members of related organizations taking responsibility for or praising some of the higher-profile attacks, but estimates about how many Uighurs have traveled to Syria or the Middle East to fight with ISIS (and how many have survived that struggle as of today) vary widely. 232 (December 2017): 1002–1025. 12 (2014), at https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiang-work-forum-marks-new-policy-of-ethnic-mingling/. 17, No. [ix] “Members of the National Security Commission debut at the News Network,” Pengpai xinwen, 17 February 2017, at, “Former senior justice official jailed for bribery,” Xinhua, 31 October 2018, at, [xlviii] China sacks ally of former security chief as graft probe widens,” Reuters, 27 March 2014, at, [lxiv] Koh Hong-Eng, “How video cameras can make cities safer and contribute to economic growth,” South China Morning Post, 3 June 2018, at, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2015-02/06/c_127467007.htm, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-01/20/c_1114065786.htm, http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-13840.html, https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2019/01/id/3707480.shtml, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/16/content_17436806.htm, https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/chinas-national-security-commission-holds-first-meeting/, http://news.sohu.com/20170217/n481030722.shtml, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/17/c_137118101.htm, http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-10/30/c_136713601.htm, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2018-03-21/doc-ifysnhat1097446.shtml, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/27/c_137003886.htm, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/whats-so-controversial-about-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201712/28/WS5a441fa5a31008cf16da3d96.html, http://www.bjnews.com.cn/inside/2018/04/06/482152.html, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1094618.shtml, https://jamestown.org/program/corralling-the-peoples-armed-police-centralizing-control-to-reflect-centralized-budgets/, https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-rise-of-the-31st-army-in-chinese-politics/, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2125880/china-brings-peoples-armed-police-under-control-top, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-lawmaking-spy-idUSKBN0IL2N520141101, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/anti-espionage/, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/2015nsl/, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/%e5%8f%8d%e6%81%90%e6%80%96%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e6%b3%95-%ef%bc%882015%ef%bc%89/, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2016-11/07/content_2001605.htm, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/cybersecuritylaw/, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/2016-foreign-ngo-law/. xÝóö6/ì p{3Ì ]‡¯üõÕ!›Ñ¥£½ñ¼‰X‹ž8P³ä8,¸ÑÛ$Pˆ…ŸØ؀«‰ÜÆ „ÐîëR›ßélø¢ƒ¹Ï{åƒìÄɔÁg=N…JμڔÀ!椹ÂÖ&ܖ&æcıvµÐóðj#Ç̋r! [xx], The final change in the structure of domestic security under Xi Jinping has been the passage of a series of laws intended to tighten control over Chinese society. [lxxiii] Beginning in 2013, police recruitment in Xinjiang increased rapidly, and then exponentially: in a twelve-month period in 2016–17, Xinjiang advertised over 90,000 security positions—twelve times the number advertised in 2009 and far outstripping the growth of private- sector employment. This framing, however, also points to China’s long-standing concern with linkages between domestic unrest and hostile forces outside of China, in particular in this context fears of Uighur separatism forming operational links with al-Qaeda and now ISIS. 52 (March 2018): 58–73; Jamie P. Horsley, “What’s so controversial about China’s new anti-corruption body,” The Diplomat, 30 May 2018, at https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/whats-so-controversial-about-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body, [xvii] Zhao Lei, “Command of Armed Police to be unified,” China Daily, 28 December 2017, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201712/28/WS5a441fa5a31008cf16da3d96.html, [xviii] Ni Wei, “Wujing gaige de chu yu jin: ba da jing zhong shoushen jianti [Armed Police Reform Emergence & Advancement: Downsizing the Eight Corps], Beijing News, 6 April 2018, at http://www.bjnews.com.cn/inside/2018/04/06/482152.html, [xix] Deng Xiaoci, “Civilian-oriented troops withdrawn from armed police force, enhancing CPC management,” Global Times, 21 March 2018, at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1094618.shtml; Adrian Zenz, Corralling the People’s Armed Police: Centralizing Control to Reflect Centralized Budgets,” Jamestown China Brief, Vol. The anti-corruption campaign targeted three parts of Zhou’s network: those from Sichuan province, the energy sector, and the public security apparatus. Sheena Greitens is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri, focused primarily on China and North Korea. In recent years the CCP has carried out increasingly stringent security measures in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). [lxxii] Domestic security spending in the region increased from 5.45 billion RMB in 2007 to 57.95 billion RMB in 2017: annual increases of 2–3 times the national average and even higher than the increases in the TAR. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Domestic Security in China under Xi Jinping,” China Leadership Monitor, Vol. Civilian-oriented units of the PAP (such as those responsible for forestry and firefighting) will be transferred to other ministries, while the PAP itself will recombine with the China Coast Guard, from which it separated in 2013. The new NSC represents a significant effort to build on earlier attempts to strengthen the power and independence of the party-state’s discipline apparatus and to institutionalize Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption efforts at a high level within the party-state. ‪Assistant Professor, University of Missouri‬ - ‪‪Cited by 627‬‬ - ‪Security‬ - ‪East Asia‬ - ‪Authoritarianism‬ - ‪Comparative Politics‬ - ‪International Relations‬ These efforts have occupied a central and visible place in his governance; for example, in 2015 Xinhua listed knife handle (daobazi, 刀把子), a euphemism for the party’s domestic security forces, as one of twelve phrases that Xi used most frequently during his first two years in office. [xvi], Xi Jinping also oversaw a significant restructuring of the People’s Armed Police in 2017-18. During Xi’s tenure, the CCP has expanded its application of technology-based tools of surveillance and social management, a process that Sebastian Heilmann calls “Digital Leninism.”. Former minister Guo Shengkun (who served from 2012 to 2017) now heads the zhengfawei; all of the vice ministers who served under Guo Shengkun in 2012 are gone, either retired (4), arrested (Li Dongsheng and Meng Hongwei), demoted (Yang Huanning, 杨焕宁), or transferred (Huang Ming, 黄明). “Domestic security in China under Xi Jinping.” China Leadership Monitor 59, 1 March, https://www.prcleader.org/greitens. . ], Renmin zhoukan [People’s Weekly], No. [lxix] The heightened security measures have targeted an increasingly broad swathe of the Uighur population and have focused on detention and political re-education under the guise of “vocational training.”  In a periodic report on China, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination raises concern about the “numerous and credible” reports of mass detentions in the XUAR, including estimates that upwards of one million Uighurs have been held for re-education and that Muslims are being treated as “enemies of the state solely on the basis of their ethno-religious identity.”[lxx], The CCP has pointed to a series of incidents of unrest, attacks, and clashes between police and protestors that occurred within and beyond the borders of the XUAR from 2009 to 2015 as evidence of a serious security and terrorist threat from Uighur separatism. And China, where the Covid-19 outbreak originated, has seized upon the pandemic to add to its existing state surveillance. Internal travel (which previously had not been unfettered) became even more tightly restricted. Zhou Yongkang’s son Zhou Bin and other family members were implicated in bribery; other senior figures in Zhou’s network who have been arrested or investigated include Li Chuncheng, former deputy party secretary of Sichuan;[xxxi] vice governor of Hainan Ji Wenlin (冀文林), who served as Zhou’s aide in the Ministry of Public Security;[xxxii] oil executive and senior official Jiang Jiemin,[xxxiii] and oil and mining executives Hua Bangsong[xxxiv] and Liu Han, the latter of whom was Zhou Bin’s business partner and was executed with his brother and three others in February 2015. In March 2017, a party document on new “de-extremification regulations” (新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例) called for transformation through education. [xl], Also removed was Minister of Justice Wu Aiying (吴爱英, 2005–2017). Additionally, in summer 2018 provincial-level public security officials in Chongqing, Shandong, Henan, and Hubei were removed, investigated, and expelled from the party, as were lower-level public security officials in Henan, Hunan, Anhui, Shanxi, Hainan, Guilin, Shenzhen, Hebei, Guangdong, and Jiangxi. Her first book, Dictators & Their Secret Police (Cambridge, 2016) received the 2017 Best Book Award from both the International Studies Association and the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization section. [viii] This is the backdrop to the creation of the CNSC. Dr. Greitens holds a Ph.D from Harvard University; an M.Phil from Oxford University, where she studied as a Marshall Scholar; and a B.A. in terms of China’s successful model of pandemic management and global health leadership,” Sheena Greitens, who teaches Asian politics at the University of Texas at Austin, said in an email. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an associate professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. To date, Huawei has assisted “Safe City” projects in over 100 cities, promoting itself as a cutting-edge public safety platform with demonstrated success in crime reduction across numerous countries. These measures are often attributed to two factors: the outbreak of unrest and protests that occurred among the Uighur population beginning in 2008–9;[lxviii] and the role of Chen Quanguo (陈全国), who became XUAR party secretary in 2016 after previously holding the same position in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) from 2011 to 2016. Meng was detained on a return trip to China in October 2018, and the CCDI issued a terse statement acknowledging that he was under investigation by the NSC. [lxiv] Governments from Singapore to Zimbabwe are adopting Chinese facial-recognition technology and information platforms to improve public security,[lxv] and Xi Jinping’s July 2018 speech to Arab leaders promised the region up to 1 billion RMB to strengthen “national stability” under the auspices of his signature Belt and Road Initiative, suggesting the potential for further expansion in the years ahead. [li], Expansion of Grid Management and Technology-Based Surveillance. The meaning of national security is being recast: according to one recent survey, many Americans now consider infectious disease to be a greater threat than terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation, or the rise of China. This framing, however, also points to China’s long-standing concern with linkages between domestic unrest and hostile forces outside of China, in particular in this context fears of Uighur separatism forming operational links with al-Qaeda and now ISIS. Sheena Greitens on North Korea's missile testing. The final change in the structure of domestic security under Xi Jinping has been the passage of a series of laws intended to tighten control over Chinese society. In March 2017, a party document on new “de-extremification regulations” (新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例) called for transformation through education. 18, No. Sheena Greitens on Understanding China’s Policies in Xinjiang How “war on terror” rhetoric contributed to the repression of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in China. [xvii] Moreover, under a reform plan codified in March 2018, the composition of the PAP itself has changed. [lxxiv] Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Xinjiang’s rapidly evolving security state,” Jamestown China Brief, Vol. To date, Huawei has assisted “Safe City” projects in over 100 cities, promoting itself as a cutting-edge public safety platform with demonstrated success in crime reduction across numerous countries. [li] Ting Gong, “Dangerous collusion: Corruption as a collective venture in contemporary China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. At the district level, information from the grids is integrated with other layers of data (on public utilities, traffic, sanitation, housing, population, crime, etc. [lviii], As part of this effort, provincial and local governments are investing heavily in various types of surveillance technologies. For instance, one recent profile of a Nanjing grid manager praises her for preventing a resident from organizing a group of petitioners who planned to travel to Beijing. The NSC was announced in October 2017 and established in spring 2018. “I think it highly likely that China will frame the Winter Games . Apart from observing residents and gathering information, grid managers and their public security counterparts sometimes engage in soft forms of repression, such as persuasion and intimidation, to preemptively demobilize potential political dissent.

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